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Despite seven years of economic growth, a large gap exists between the
wages earned by workers at the top of the earnings scale and those at the
bottom. The leading explanation for this growth in wage inequality con-
tinues to be the skills-mismatch theory. This theory in part posits that
gains in technology have resulted in jobs having technical skill require-
ments that have outpaced growth in worker skills; demand for highly
skilled workers there f o re rises more swiftly than that for less-skilled
workers, creating upward pre s s u re on wages for those with the most
skills. In other words, technological advances have increased the num-
ber of high-skill jobs relative to low-skill jobs, but worker skills have not
kept up.
The dramatic growth, beginning in the 1980s, in the use of computers in
the workplace made the skills-mismatch theory plausible. During the
1980s this theory was the key explanation for increasing returns to edu-
cation; as a postulate, it “explained” that minority workers’ lack of skills
was the cause of their relative disadvantage in the labor market.
Policymakers, having accepted this theory, expressed alarm over the fail-
u re of the American educational system to provide workers with the
skills needed to succeed in the new, high-tech economy. Thus, it was
thought that educational programs aimed at upgrading skills would raise
wages among minority and low-skill workers.
In this brief, however, Michael J. Handel examines the evidence used to
support this theory and finds it lacking. The empirical data show little
sign of a shortage of workers with computer skills or technical skills in
general. Handel argues that it is not sufficient to show a re l a t i o n s h i p
between technology and the demand for skilled workers; in order for the
skills-mismatch theory to be plausible it must be shown that the rate of
technological change, which would shift demand in favor of high-skill
P re f a c eworkers, accelerated during periods of increasing wage inequality. What
he finds is that most of the growth of inequality actually p re c e d e d t h e
slowdown in the growth of educational attainment and did not coincide
with an acceleration in demand toward more skilled work. The evi-
dence, there f o re, is not strong enough to support the argument that
computers or information technology have done much to alter either the
skill content of work within occupations or the occupational composi-
tion of the workforce.
If Handel’s analysis is correct, then policymakers may need to re t h i n k
policies aimed at closing the wage gap. His conclusions indicate that
improved education and training alone will not solve the wage inequal-
ity problem; rather, the solution may require much more, such as macro-
economic policies aimed at maintaining economic growth and full
employment, and labor policies (such as increases in the minimum
wage) that support the earnings of workers at the lower end of the wage
scale. Considering the important role that the skills-mismatch theory
has played in policy development over the past two decades, it is worth
reexamining so that policymakers can evaluate current strategies aimed
at eliminating wage inequality and consider alternate means by which
to alleviate this pro b l e m .
I trust that you will find the research contained in this brief insightful,
and that it will provide some of the tools necessary for reexamining the
skills-mismatch theory and those policies proposed to alleviate wage dis-
parities. As always, I invite your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
Public Policy Brief 67 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
A leading explanation for the recent growth of wage inequality in the
United States is a widening gap between the demand for and supply of
m o re-skilled workers. Concern about the match between worker skills
and job skill re q u i rements has a long and interesting history. In the 1970s
sociologists argued that employers’ excessive hiring re q u i rements were
causing American workers to obtain more education than their jobs re a l l y
re q u i red (Berg 1971; Collins 1979). Economists re p o rted that an oversup-
ply of well-educated workers had driven the college–high school wage dif-
f e rential to historic lows, with moderate prospects for improvement in the
1980s and 1990s relative to earlier levels (Freeman 1976, 73 ff . ) .
Policymakers wondered how they could make work more satisfying as the
complexity of jobs at all levels failed to grow as rapidly as workers’ educa-
tional levels and aspirations for meaningful work (U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and We l f a re 1973). Harry Braverm a n ’s contro v e r s i a l
deskilling hypothesis raised the prospect that the skill content of most
jobs was actually declining, even as individuals’ educational attainment
continued to rise (Braverman 1974). Despite diff e rent approaches, most
analysts agreed there was a glut of high-skilled workers relative to the
number of jobs that could make full use of their skills.
What a diff e rence a decade makes. In the 1980s the balance of opinion
among sociologists shifted to the view that technology was increasing the
relative number of high-skill jobs, consistent with Daniel Bell’s theory of
an emerging information society (Bell 1976; Form 1987; Attewell 1987;
Wright and Martin 1987). Policymakers were so alarmed by the failure of
schools to keep up with the postindustrial economy’s need for skills that
they compared the education system to a national security risk (U.S.
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National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983), established
commissions to clarify the skills that all workers needed (U.S.
D e p a rtment of Labor 1991), and authorized new programs to set national
occupational skill standards and improve the transition from school to
work. Sociologists argued that an increasing mismatch between employer
re q u i rements and workers’ skills was a principal source of minority work-
ers’ disadvantage in the labor market (Wilson 1987). Economists studying
the large growth in wage inequality in the 1980s concluded that the ris-
ing payoff to education reflected a more general imbalance between the
g rowth of the supply of and demand for skilled labor that was caused by
changes in technology (Katz and Murphy 1992). The demand for skills
seemed to have suddenly raced ahead of supply. In just a few years, glut
seemed to have turned into serious shortage, even more remarkable since
most workers in the 1980s had also been working in the 1970s.1
But is it true? Is the growth in inequality in the 1980s attributable to his-
torically large shifts in job skill requirements favoring the more skilled?
The dramatic growth of computers and microelectronics gives the argu-
ment plausibility, but the question resists easy answer.
A review of a large and disparate literature that tries to measure directly
employer demand for skills, workers’ stock of skills, and any imbalance
between the two does not yield unambiguous evidence of a skills short-
age any time in the last twenty years. Many employers have basic liter-
acy re q u i rements even for jobs filled by less-educated workers and
express dissatisfaction with the quality of employees and job applicants.
But it is not at all clear that their dissatisfaction is primarily with work-
ers’ level of cognitive or technical skills rather than with perceived work
attitudes. Nor is it clear whether employer complaints extend beyond
young workers, who are likely to acquire the desired attitudes and skills
as they mature and gain job experience. The lack of clear evidence of a
cognitive skills shortage persists even in the face of surprisingly low cog-
nitive test scores among a large segment of the American workforc e ,
though tests of high school seniors indicate there has been no meaning-
ful change in young people’s reading and math test scores since the early
1970s, contrary to popular perceptions of decline. There is little evi-
dence that computer skills are in especially short supply, part i c u l a r l y
among the young, despite the technology focus of much of this debate,nor is there evidence of a general shortage of other technical or high-
level skills (for details see Handel 2000a).
The general problem in studying the postindustrial skills mismatch expla-
nation of wage inequality growth is that trends in wage inequality are re a d-
ily documented, but trends in job skill re q u i rements and technology
d i ffusion are not. Even when all the variables can be measured, there are
d i fficulties establishing causal relationships among them. Furt h e r, it is not
s u fficient to show a relationship between technology and demand for more -
skilled workers; to explain the exceptional growth of inequality during the
1980s, it must be shown that the rate of technological change that shifts
demand in favor of high-skilled workers a c c e l e r a t e d during that time, since
economists generally acknowledge that technology has been raising skill
re q u i rements for a long time (Mishel and Bernstein 1994; Mishel,
B e rnstein, and Schmitt 1997). This has led some advocates of the skill-
biased technological change thesis to suggest that the cause of the skills gap
may not be a technology-induced acceleration in the demand for skill but a
slowdown in the growth of educational attainment or supply of skilled
workers (Katz and Murphy 1992; Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998).
C l e a r l y, the two versions of the skills mismatch hypothesis imply very
different views of the underlying processes generating inequality growth.
The demand-side explanation is consistent with the postindustrial vision
in which high technology has dramatically upgraded skill requirements,
while the supply-side explanation suggests no break with the past in
terms of technology’s effect on skill requirements, locating the cause of
the skills shortage in the failure of the educational system to keep up
with a secular trend in technology as it has in the past.
This policy brief examines both the supply- and demand-side explanations,
giving special attention to technology’s role in raising job skill require-
ments. It examines trends in inequality growth and various measures of
skill and technology use, including workers’ educational attainment,
occupations’ shares of the workforce, direct measures of job skill
re q u i rements, and use of computers at work. The results indicate that
most inequality growth preceded the slowdown in the growth of educa-
tional attainment and did not coincide with an acceleration of tre n d s
toward more skilled work. Computer technology does not appear to have
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ples of dispro p o rtionate growth or decline in occupations likely to be
sensitive to technological change. In short, the results do not suggest
that inequality growth reflects the growth of a skills gap owing to either
a slowdown in the growth of supply or an acceleration in demand and it
is hard to find evidence that computers or information technology have
done much to alter either the skill content of work within occupations
or the occupational composition of the workforce.2
Trends in Wa ge Inequality and the 
S u p p ly of and Demand for Education
Any explanation of trends in wage inequality will have to be consistent
with the temporal pattern of inequality growth. Figure 1 shows the trend
in wage inequality among wage and salary workers from 1979 to 1997,
using the variance of log wages. The nonlinearity of the growth is imme-
diately evident. About 50 percent of the growth of inequality between
1979 and 1993 occurs in the years 1981 to 1983, coinciding with the deep-
est recession in U.S. history since the Great Depression and prior to the
g reatest diffusion of computers. Inequality growth then flattens out a n d
declines somewhat in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The large growth
Is There a Skills Crisis?
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in inequality between 1993 and 1994 may reflect a continuation of the
i n c rease visible between 1992 and 1993 but may well also re f l e c t
changes in the survey design. After 1994 inequality declines modestly.
The solid line in Figure 2 shows the trend in mean years of education.
There is a nearly linear rise in workers’ mean years of education between
1962 and 1983, then a slowdown in growth between 1983 and 1991 and
an even flatter trend between 1992 and 1997.
As noted, Katz and Murphy (1992) suggest the skills mismatch responsi-
ble for the growth in inequality may reflect a slowdown in the growth
rate of the supply of more-educated workers in the 1980s rather than any
acceleration in demand. But a closer inspection of the evidence reveals
problems with this supply-side explanation. If one were to assume that
supply and demand were in equilibrium prior to the 1980s and demand
continued to grow at a constant rate thereafter while supply gro w t h
slowed, as Katz and Murphy suggest, the trend in demand would look
something like the dotted line in Figure 2, which simply extrapolates
from the growth rate in the supply of educated workers for 1974 to 1979.
As can be seen, a skills gap emerges, as the supply-side neoclassical
explanation of rising inequality predicts.
Fi g u re 2 Trends in the Supply of and Projected Demand for Education
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The only problem is that the timing of the emergence and widening of
the skills gap is inconsistent with the temporal pattern of inequality
growth. In Figure 2 the skills gap is either not present or minor in the
early 1980s and grows more severe as time progresses, reaching its widest
point in 1997. Yet, as Figure 1 shows, inequality grew most rapidly in the
early 1980s, moderated steadily as the decade progressed, and overall did
not grow much in the 1990s (the sharp spike in 1994 notwithstanding)
despite the flat trend in workforce education levels. The timing of
inequality does not correspond to the deceleration in the growth of
workers’ educational attainment.
The problem for the neoclassical explanation is even more serious than
Figure 2 suggests. It is well known that there was an oversupply of edu-
cated labor in the 1970s (Freeman 1976), so the demand line in Figure 2
should be drawn below the supply line in that decade, which would
mean the skills gap would not emerge until even later than shown. The
only way to derive a skills deficit in the early 1980s following the skills
glut in the late 1970s is to assume significant acceleration in the growth
of demand for skill, as Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1997) have
a rgued is implicit in the skill-biased technological change arg u m e n t .
Whether technology can reasonably be argued to have had a stro n g e r
effect in the early 1980s than it did in previous decades will be consid-
ered in subsequent sections.
Some analysts might argue that the growth in wage inequality is not
related to a slowdown in the growth of average educational levels, but to
an increase in the inequality of educational attainment. However,
inequality in years of education declined from 1962 to 1987, albeit at a
somewhat decelerating rate, before flattening out (Handel 2000a).
Changes in the distribution of education or human capital have not con-
tributed to inequality growth but have had an equalizing effect until
relatively recently.
The Relationship bet ween Education and Comp u ter Use
The skills mismatch hypothesis relies heavily on the notion that
computers have increased the educational re q u i rements of jobs. A series ofTrends in Job Skill Require m e n t s,Te c h n o l o g y, and Wage Inequality in the United States
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re g ression models show that computer users do have more education than
o t h e rwise similar workers; the diff e rence is on the order of one-half to one
y e a r, depending on the controls included in the model (Handel 2000a).3
But these results do not settle the issue. Firms that could aff o rd computers
may have been more able to aff o rd more-educated workers as well. Or
f i rms may have initially given computers to more-educated workers
because they had higher status or held positions in which computers were
most complementary to their tasks, such as office work. In these cases the
association in the cross-sectional models between computer use and
higher educational level would not imply a causal link between the two.
For example, one might find that the manager of a construction com-
pany uses a computer at work and has somewhat more education than a
carpenter working for the firm. No one would attribute the educational
differential to the introduction of computers into the manager’s job. The
educational differential long predates the introduction of computers and
the differential computer use merely reflects the fact that computers are
not very useful for carpentry but are very useful for office work. In this
case, the association between computers and education would not reflect
some additional increment of skill that computers have introduced into
the workplace.
There is also the issue of interpreting the magnitude of the association,
even assuming the observed association is causal. If one accepts that a
worker who uses a computer must have an additional one-half to one
year of education compared to an otherwise similar worker, this implies
about a 3 to 8 percent wage premium for computer use operating
t h rough enhanced educational re q u i rements alone, not counting any
direct effect on wages through computer-specific human capital. The low
end of this range, which is the more probable, does not seem larg e
enough to account for much of the observed growth in inequality,
though if one accepts the high end and adds some large wage effect for
computer use itself (e.g. Krueger 1993), then the situation is less clear.
Despite the problems in determining causality or judging magnitudes, it is
useful to note that the educational upgrading effect of computers is not
l i k e l y, even by relatively generous estimates, to exceed one year of educat i o n ,which at least provides an upper bound and a caution for those who would
see computers as dramatically upgrading the educational re q u i rements of
work. Even in the most favorable case, computers are not typically leading
to the replacement of workers who have a high school education with work-
ers who have a four-year or even a junior college education.
Of course, some people use computers for much more complicated tasks
than do others and the small magnitude of the overall educational
d i ff e rential may be due to a failure to distinguish between jobs that
require a large increment in education when computers are introduced
and jobs in which the computer tasks are sufficiently simple that little
educational upgrading is necessary. This is another situation that is not
so simple. Workers using computers for inventory and invoice functions
have less education (about 0.2 fewer years) than otherwise similar work-
ers. Workers using the Internet, spreadsheets, and word processing pro-
grams have the greatest educational advantage (about 0.3 years) over
o t h e rwise similar workers, while workers using computers for pro g r a m-
ming or computer aided design are little different from otherwise similar
workers. This does not reflect one’s expectations regarding the relative
skill re q u i rements of these diff e rent tasks. In short, specific computer
tasks do not seem to be reliably related to educational differentials (see
also DiNardo and Pischke 1997; Handel 1999).
To address the problem of causality, cross-sectional analyses can be
replaced with analyses of the relationship between changes in the educa-
tional composition of occupations and changes in the level of computer
use within occupations between 1984 and 1997.4 These models predict
that if an occupation went from having no computer users to 100 per-
cent computer users, the mean education of workers in the occupation
would increase by 0.2 years, well below even the lower-bound estimate of
one-half year mentioned above.
When years of education is broken into five categories (less than high
school, high school degree, some college, college degree, and postgradu-
ate), the analyses suggest that a 25 percentage point increase in computer
use within occupations, about average for the period 1984 to 1997, was
associated with a 2.7 percentage point decline in the share of workers with
Is There a Skills Crisis?
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college degree within an occupation. By comparison, the actual share of
workers with a high school degree declined by 6.7 percentage points and
the share of workers with a college degree increased 5.3 percentage points
during this period, suggesting that any increase in educational re q u i re-
ments occasioned by the spread of computers was easily absorbed.
H o w e v e r, further analyses suggest that even these associations do not
reflect a causal connection between computer use and occupations’
educational re q u i rements. When changes in educational levels within
occupations for 1971 to 1976 are related to changes in computer use
within occupations for 1984 to 1997 the results are remarkably similar
(Handel 2000a). It appears that the growth of computer use at a later
point in time is as good a predictor of educational upgrading in the past
as it is a predictor of contemporaneous educational upgrading within
occupations! In other words, occupations that increased their computer
use most in the 1980s were already upgrading educational levels for other
reasons in the early 1970s, prior to the diffusion of computers. This suggests
that the association between changes in computer use and skill upgrading is
not a causal relationship. The same occupations that upgraded in the 1980s
and 1990s, when computers diffused rapidly, had upgraded educational
levels long before then.
Trends in Major Occupational GroupsÕ 
S h a res of the Wo rk fo rce 
Although workers’ educational attainment is the principal measure of job
skill re q u i rements within economics, most sociologists would consider
occupation to be a better indicator of the nature of jobs rather than the per-
sonal characteristics of those filling them. This section examines whether
t h e re is evidence of occupational upgrading and, more import a n t l y,
whether any such trend accelerated over the course of the 1980s in a fash-
ion that might explain inequality growth and suggest a role for technology.
In general, the data do not suggest acceleration of demand shifts
throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, but there was a sharp decline
Trends in Job Skill Require m e n t s,Te c h n o l o g y, and Wage Inequality in the United States
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15Is There a Skills Crisis?
Public Policy Brief 16
in the share of blue-collar workers in manufacturing in the early 1980s,
when inequality rose sharply. The absence of a similar trend in later
years calls into question explanations based on adoption of high tech-
nology and suggests a greater role for macroeconomic and trade policies
in this sharp drop.
It is useful to begin with a long view. Figures 3 and 4 present trends in the
s h a re of the workforce for five highly aggregated occupational groups fro m
1900 to 1990. Despite changes in occupational codes, there is a reason-
able degree of comparability across decades at this level of aggregation.
F i g u re 3 shows that not only did the share of the highest skill gro u p ,
upper white-collar workers (managers, professionals, technical workers)
grow substantially, from 10 percent of the workforce in 1900 to 30 per-
cent in 1990, but this increase accelerated, with the fastest gro w t h
between 1970 and 1990. However, there is no difference in the growth
rate between the 1970s and the 1980s, and more recent data do not
indicate any change in the 1990s. In short, there would seem to be little
about demand for upper white-collar workers in the 1980s that would





















Figure 3 Trends in Upper and Lower White-collar Workers as a
Percentage of the Workforce
Source: Decennial census.Trends in Job Skill Require m e n t s,Te c h n o l o g y, and Wage Inequality in the United States
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g rowth in inequality. However, the continued increase in the upper
white-collar share when their relative wages were presumably rising may
be evidence for an acceleration in underlying demand.
F i g u re 3 also shows that the share of lower white-collar workers (sales,
clerical) rose throughout the century until 1970, from 7.5 percent to
roughly 28 percent of the workforce, but essentially stopped gro w i n g
between 1970 and 1990. More recent data suggest a decline between
1983 and 1997 of a bit more than 1 percentage point, and the diffusion of
computer technology is a plausible candidate for a factor in this decline.
Figure 4 shows that the share of craft workers remained relatively con-
stant during the century, fluctuating between roughly 11 and 14 percent,
although there was a modest decline, without acceleration, between
1970 and 1990. However, the share of lower blue-collar workers (opera-
tives, transport operators, laborers) declined consistently and markedly
in the postwar period from a high of roughly 28 percent in 1940 to a low
of less than 15 percent in 1990, but, again, the trend in the 1980s does






















Figure 4 Trends in Craft, Lower Blue-collar, and Service Employment
as a Percentage of the Workforce
Source: Decennial census.Is There a Skills Crisis?
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I n t e re s t i n g l y, annual employment data indicate that almost all of the
decline in the lower blue-collar share since 1980 occurred prior to 1985.
Between 1965 and 1985 the share of lower blue-collar workers declined
by an average 0.42 percent per year, while the rate for 1985 to 1997 was
0.11 percent per year. That flatness does not reflect the decline of manu-
facturing’s overall share of the workforce. The contrast between the rates
of decline in the two periods for lower blue-collar workers within manu-
facturing, 0.52 percent and 0.05 percent, is even more stark, even
though it is within manufacturing that one might expect technology to
have the greatest effect. Wi t h i n - i n d u s t ry shifts are often used as mea-
s u res of technological change. However, as Figure 5 shows, the steep
decline in the share of lower blue-collar workers within manufacturing
virtually halted by 1985. From that year onwards there is essentially ran-
dom variation around a constant level. If automation and computer-
controlled processes were making lower blue-collar workers redundant in
unprecedented numbers, there is no evidence for it in these figures.
Some have raised the possibility that the relative stability of the blue-collar
share within manufacturing after 1985 reflects the decline in these work-
















Figure 5 Trend in the Share of Blue-collar Workers in Manufacturing
1962–1997
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Note: Break in series between 1982 and 1983.
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when they were better paid (Eli Berman, Boston University, personal com-
munication). If t h e s h a re of blue-collar employment is stable in the face
of declining relative wages, then presumably underlying demand for these
workers is still falling. However, the relative stability of lower blue-collar
employment in manufacturing after 1985 does not correspond to any
marked change in the hourly wages of lower blue-collar workers re l a t i v e
to other workers in manufacturing (see Handel 2000a, Figures 10 and 11).
The rapid decline in the demand for blue-collar workers occurred during
the early 1980s, prior to the widespread diffusion of computer or other
advanced micro e l e c t ronics, suggesting that the recession and trade
deficits of the early 1980s, rather than an upsurge in factory automation
and consequent labor displacement, were responsible for the observ e d
t rends. Furt h e r, the correspondence of this trend with the growth in
inequality in the early 1980s suggests the importance of the decline of
blue-collar manufacturing work for inequality growth, long emphasized
by Bluestone and Harrison (1983; Harrison and Bluestone 1988), rather
than the emergence of an information economy.
Figure 4 also shows that the share of workers in low-skill service occupa-
tions has grown modestly from about 9 percent (1900) to a little over 13
percent (1990), but the growth in this occupational group does not seem
sufficiently large to account for much of the growth in wage inequality,
despite frequent statements of concern.
By contrast, the share of workers in farm occupations (not shown in fig-
ure) fell from 37.5 percent in 1900 to 2.5 percent in 1990, by far a larger
change than in any other group examined here. Although this decline is
little noticed in the long-running sociological debate on skills, clearly,
skill trends over the course of the twentieth century depend more on this
decline and how one evaluates the skill level of declining farm occupa-
tions than on any other single trend (cf. Braverman 1974, 381; Spenner
1983, 825). However, the change in the share of farm occupations has
been slight since 1965 and is not relevant to the study of the growth of
inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.
Summarizing the figures for the nonagricultural workforce and making
allowance for the difficulty of rank ordering the lower white-collar occupa-
tional group with respect to craft and lower blue-collar occupations, onecan say with reasonable confidence that the trend has been one of general
upgrading of job skill levels, but trends in the 1980s and 1990s do not
appear upon initial inspection to have accelerated—despite the growth of
i n f o rmation technology—in marked contrast to trends in wage inequality.
Trends in the Grow th of Occupations 
Pote n t i a l ly Sensitive to Te chnological Change
Trends in the composition of employment by aggregated occupational
group can give some indication of the direction and pace of skill shifts
and the role of technology. For example, the trend for blue-collar manu-
facturing workers does not suggest that factory automation has displaced
l a rge numbers of less-skilled workers. However, the use of bro a d
occupational groups is limiting. One can examine the possible effects of
technological change on the occupational distribution in a more
detailed fashion using finer occupational categories that one might
suspect a priori to be especially sensitive to technological change.
Technology can alter the demand for skill by altering the skill content
within occupations or by adding workers at the top of the occupational
skill hierarchy or eliminating them at the bottom, for example as a result
of automation.
Table 1 presents trends in diff e rent detailed occupations’ share of the
w o r k f o rce or of certain industries and annual rates of change for specific
years between 1971 and 1997. The first two rows present trends for scien-
tists, engineers, and technicians. If information technology were incre a s-
ing the skill re q u i rements of work by adding workers at the top, one
would expect the shares of these workers to rise; if the rising share were
related to inequality growth in the 1980s, one would expect acceleration
in that decade. The data indicate that the shares of workers in these two
g roups grew steadily, but remained relatively small; their growth acceler-
ated only modestly in the 1980s and 1990s, but was rapid during the
re c e s s i o n a ry period of the early 1980s. Despite much talk of the growth of
knowledge workers, most upper white-collar workers are not in highly
technical occupations and growth rates remain relatively low.
Rows 3 and 4 indicate that despite the visible and dramatic growth of
the importance of computers in the economy, computer systems analysts/
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Table 1 Trends in the Percentage Share of Specific Occupations Potentially
Sensitive to Technological Change, 1971–1997
Occupation Percentage Share
1 Annual Rate of Change
1971 1979 1982 1983 1997 1971–79 1979–82 1983–97
Scientific/Technical 
Workers
Scientist/Engineer 2.62 2.69 3.15 3.15 3.91 0.01 0.15 0.05
Technicians 2.68 2.82 3.21 3.28 3.52 0.02 0.13 0.02
Computer Workers
Systems Analysts
2 0.10 0.28 0.35 0.32 1.16 0.02 0.02 0.06
Programmers 0.25 0.36 0.47 0.40 0.56 0.01 0.04 0.01
Retail Trade Workers
Cashiers (percent of 
g ro c e ry workers) 17.79 24.30 25.08 29.60 28.96 0.81 0.26 –0.05
Clerks (percent of 
retail and 
wholesale workers) 2.21 1.60 1.83 1.56 1.40 –0.08 0.08 –0.01
Clerical Workers
All clericals 17.19 18.24 18.46 16.85 14.12 0.13 0.07 –0.20
Manager/Clerical 
Ratio 1.45 1.47 1.57 1.58 2.22 0.00 0.03 0.05
All clericals (percent 
of banking and
insurance) 52.96 53.62 50.76 50.04 39.66 0.08 0.95 0.74
Secretaries 3.63 4.11 4.07 4.16 2.28 0.06 –0.01 –0.13
Manager/Secretary
Ratio 6.86 6.53 7.11 6.38 13.75 –0.04 0.19 0.53
Tellers (percent of 
bank workers) 20.62 25.33 23.62 19.78 18.03 0.59 –0.57 –0.13
Postal Clerks 
(percent of 
postal workers) 37.52 36.06 39.28 34.56 33.50 –0.18 1.07 –0.08
Telephone Workers
3
Operators 21.35 14.36 12.51 6.82 3.94 –0.87 –0.62 –0.21
Installer/Repairer 31.86 30.91 28.44 26.34 17.41 –0.12 –0.82 –0.64
Auto Workers
3
Assemblers  14.95 18.60 14.66 15.90 20.42 0.46 –1.31 0.32
Welders/Painters 6.95 8.29 5.61 3.97 7.59 0.17 –0.89 0.26
Notes: All figures weighted by hours worked in previous week. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are
percentages of total workforce.
1  The choice of specific years in the left panel reflects the change in occupational coding schemes
between 1982 and 1983, which fortunately is not a large problem in many cases here, and the desir-
ability of isolating changes in the early 1980s, which was a period of abrupt change in wage inequality,
as noted earlier. All figures are weighted by hours worked as well as by CPS sample weights. All figures
for the years shown have been checked against plots for the entire period to insure that conclusions
are not substantively affected by choice of period endpoints.
2   The Systems Analysts category also includes Computer Scientists.
3 These percentages represent the share of the occupation within this industry only, not as a share of all
workers.
Source: March CPS.computer scientists and programmers represented less than 2 percent of
the workforce as recently as 1997. While the growth of systems analysts
and computer scientists did accelerate in the late 1980s, they remain a
small group and the share of programmers, surprisingly, does not seem to
have accelerated for most of the period covered here.5
The first four rows of Table 1 are high-skilled occupations that might be
expected to expand with the growth in high technology. Clearly, rather
than accelerating dramatically in the 1980s, the growth of these occu-
pations has been rather steady over time. The remaining rows are
occupations, most of them less-skilled, that many have argued are being
eliminated by the impressive spread of computer and micro e l e c t ro n i c
t e c h n o l o g y. Danziger and Gottschalk (1995, 141) express the conven-
tional wisdom that beginning in the 1980s, firms
substituted computers and more-skilled workers for
l o w e r-skilled workers whose tasks could now be per-
f o rmed more efficiently with computers. Insurance
companies could lay off file clerks . . . checkout clerks
no longer had to enter prices in the cash re g i s t e r.
I n v e n t o ry control was simplified and re o rdering could be
done automatically. In these and other ways, technology
(or automation) decreased the value of the skills of
workers with lower levels of education and incre a s e d
demand for workers with more education.
In this passage, Danziger and Gottschalk link the labor-displacing effect
of computers to the growth of wage inequality. The examples they cite
and others they do not mention, such as bank tellers, have much
common-sensical appeal. However, trends in these occupations have
rarely been examined systematically.
In the section of Table 1 on the share of occupations in retail industries,
Row 5 presents trends in the percentage of grocery store workers who are
cashiers—the checkout clerks who are most likely to use scanners rather
than entering prices manually. Cashiers grew as a percentage of grocery
workers in the 1970s and then declined modestly after 1983, consistent
with the scanner story. A plot of the data for all years (not shown) indi-
cates that the trend was flat from 1983 to 1991 and the decline
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have stopped the growth in the cashier share evident in the 1970s, but
there seems to have been very little actual decline, even after nearly two
decades of scanner diffusion. This is not to say that scanners may not
have had an effect on productivity, by speeding customer throughput or
generating more readily used information for inventory and planning
databases. It is merely to say that there has been little decline in
employment as a result, though growth has clearly halted.6
Danziger and Gottschalk also refer to the computerization of inventory
c o n t rol, which presumably reduces the need for shipping, stock, and
i n v e n t o ry clerks to keep track of stock. However, Row 6 in Table 1 indi-
cates that the share of clerks in retail and wholesale declined more rapidly
in the 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s.7 These data, combined with
those for cashiers, do not suggest that, although highly visible, computer
and micro e l e c t ronic technologies have displaced much labor in re t a i l .
The next section of the table deals with clerical work. As a share of all
workers, clerical workers as a group grew during the 1970s and declined
steadily after 1983. This series is rather strong evidence that the century-
long increase in the clerical employment share has ended, though the
full data series indicates the most dramatic declines were from 1986 to
1989 and especially from 1992 to 1997, after the large increase in wage
i n e q u a l i t y. The ratio of managers and professionals to clerical workers
(Row 8), a measure of “clerical productivity” since most clerical workers
support the work of managers and professionals, increased sharply from
1992 to 1997, though less dramatic increases are evident as early as the
1970s. In the absence of more detailed information, it is unclear whether
to ascribe the growth in this ratio to technology or to more general cost-
cutting policies on the part of employers. Even so, the ratio’s sharp
growth in the 1990s is at least consistent with a role for computer tech-
nology in reducing demand for clerical work, but the growth does not
coincide with the period of inequality growth.
A stronger case for the possible impact of information technology on cleri-
cal employment is the trend in clerical workers as a percentage of workers
in finance and insurance (Row 9). Clerical tasks in these industries are
highly repetitive and routine and these industries have long been l e a d e r s
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steady as a share of finance and insurance employment in the 1970s, the
clerical share for these industries falls more sharply than for any other
occupation in the table. Figure 6 shows that the decline was consistent
t h roughout the 1980s and 1990s.8 Danziger and Gottschalk’s hypothesis
that computers have automated the work of file clerks in this sector seems
well supported. This occupational group clearly shows the pattern one
would expect if information technology were driving shifts in skill
demand through changes in the occupational composition of employ-
ment. Unfortunately for the skill-biased technological change hypothesis,
it is one of the few occupational groups to show such a clear pattern .
The share of secretaries in the workforce (Row 10) begins to decline
a round 1983 and falls consistently there a f t e r. Similarly, the ratio of
managers and professionals to secretaries (Row 11) is flat for the 1970s,
rises significantly between 1983 and 1991, and then accelerates dramati-
cally after 1992. There is some question as to whether the decline in the
s e c retarial share is real or an artifact of changing categorization, with more
of these workers being assigned to the residual “clerical workers, not
e l s e w h e re classified” category (Autor 1995). Given the overall decline in
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Fi g u re 6 Trends in the Share of Clerical Workers as a Percentage of
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the share of clerical workers, it is not clear that this is a re a s o n a b l e
supposition, but in any case, whether the relative decline of secre t a r i e s
is genuine or not, the timing is not consistent with the pattern of
inequality gro w t h .
Row 12 of Table 1 gives trends in tellers as a percentage of all workers in
banking. The rapid spread of automated teller machines (ATMs) would
seem to make this occupation an ideal candidate for obsolescence. In fact,
the data in the table and in Figure 7 show no such strong trend, but at
best a one-time drop in the teller share in the early 1980s. There is some
m odest growth in the teller share during the 1970s, a large drop between
1982 and 1983 (which may reflect either genuine change or occupational
c oding changes) and a modest overall decline over the next 14 years.9
Census data for 1980 and 1990, which are less subject to the changes in
occupational codes than the annual data in Table 1, and a 1970 Census
extract coded using both the 1970s and 1980s occupational codes suggest
that the observed decline between 1982–1983 may be genuine rather
than an artifact of the changes in occupational classification schemes. If
so, the share of tellers declined from an average of about 23 percent fro m
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1971 to 1982 to an average of about 18 percent from 1983 to 1997,
mostly within the space of a single year in the early 1980s. The timing of
the decline coincides with both the recession and the growth of inequal-
i t y, but the flatness of the trend for most of the 1980s and 1990s casts
some doubt on a technology explanation. While it is possible that AT M s
had such an abrupt impact, the trend, unlike that for all clerical workers
within banking and insurance, does not correspond to intuition about the
e ffects of automation on the composition of employment. There is cer-
tainly no evidence in Figure 7 that ATMs have re n d e red the teller occu-
pation obsolete. This finding is consistent with sector studies of tellers
within banking (Larry Hunter, Wharton School, personal communication).
Like clerical tasks in banking and insurance, back office work in the
U.S. Postal Service is a highly standardized, high-volume operation. In
principle, this makes it ideal for automation on a large scale.
N e v e rtheless, rather surprisingly, Row 13 indicates that postal clerks
have not declined much as a share of all postal workers in the last 25
y e a r s .1 0 F u rt h e r, the 1980s and 1990s do not seem to differ from the
1970s in this regard.
The telephone industry has been substituting electrical and electro n i c
equipment for labor in a highly visible fashion since its inception.
Indeed, the transistor was invented by Bell Labs, so it is not surprising
that micro e l e c t ronics have replaced switchboard operators and other
workers over time. Table 1, Row 14 indicates that operators declined
f rom over 21 percent of all telephone workers to less than 4 perc e n t
between 1971 and 1997.11 What is interesting is that the rate of decline
was faster in the 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s.
Telephone installers and repairers are another substantial fraction of all
employment in the industry and have likely been affected by improve-
ments in telephone switching equipment. The share of these workers
declined by nearly half from 1971 to 1997, from 32 percent to 17.5 per-
cent (Row 15). The rate of decline for this group did accelerate in the
mid 1980s and 1990s relative to the 1970s when calculated on the basis
of the years shown in Table 1. However, a plot of the full series, along
with Census figures from 1960 to 1990, casts some doubt on this result.27 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Finally, Table 1 shows trends for the percentage of workers in the auto
industry who are assemblers (Row 16) and welders or painters (Row 17).
The auto industry is the leader in the use of industrial robots, and
welders and painters are believed to be most strongly affected. Figures for
assemblers are presented for comparative purposes, since automation
efforts are widely recognized to have failed in auto assembly (John Paul
MacDuffie, Wharton School, personal communication). Rather surpris-
ingly, although the shares of both groups declined for a few years in the
early 1980s, their shares have increased somewhat since then.1 2 O f
course, robots may be displacing labor in large firms but that displace-
ment may be offset by increased outsourcing to more labor intensive sub-
contractors. Nevertheless, there seems to be no overall effect of robots or
automation on the employment of either assemblers, welders, or painters
in the auto industry, using these data. Census data do suggest a modest
decline in the share of welders and painters in the auto industry, but
there is little difference between the rate of decline from 1970 to 1980
and the rate from 1980 to 1990.
It should be noted that most of the preceding has dealt with office jobs,
many of which are predominantly staffed by women. Indeed, computers
are primarily an office, rather than a factory, technology and might be
expected to have less impact among men in the lower part of the occu-
pational stru c t u re. The fact that this group has experienced the most
severe wage losses in the last two decades may be another clue that tech-
nology is less important than commonly believed.
Trends in Direct Measures of Job Skill Re qu i re m e n t s
While the broad occupational categories examined above are useful
rough measures of job skill requirements, a more fine-grained measure is
desirable. This section uses previously unexamined individual-level data
on job skill re q u i rements and occupation-level data applied to a long
time series. The results show that job skill requirements have increased
in the last several decades, but there is little evidence of recent accelera-
tion in mean job skill requirements. These findings are consistent with
the notion that job skill re q u i rements have risen at a consistent but
modest rate over time (Spenner 1979).
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The advantages of individual-level skill measures are clear. Job skill
requirements vary both within and between census occupational group-
ings and only individual-level measures capture both. Occupation-level
measures can be used for charting skill shifts that result from changes in
the occupational composition of the workforce, but necessarily wash out
all within-occupation variation at any one time and over time if jobs are
not subsequently rerated.
The individual-level measures are survey responses to questions asking
the level of formal education the respondent needed for his or her job
and the time it takes the average person to learn the job. These variables
are referred to as “education required” and “training time.” Measures are
drawn from two different series of surveys, the first covering 1969, 1972,
and 1977, and the second covering 1976 and 1985.1 3 T h e re are some
comparability problems across the series; this calls for caution in splicing
the two together and makes the results necessarily tentative. However,
they are worth examining together because they are the only sources of
data for re p resentative samples for the period 1969 to 1985, allowing
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Table 2 Trends in Formal Education Requirements 1969–1986
Education Required SWC/QES PSID Annual Rate of Change __________ _____ _____________________
1969 1977 1976 1985 1 9 6 9 – 7 7 1 9 7 6 – 8 5
Grades 0–8 25.700 14.700 25.100 11.700 –1.400 –1.500
Grades 9–11 10.500 6.700 1.900 1.500 –0.500 –0.000
High School, High School
+ Voca t i o n a lE d u c a t i o n ,
Some College 47.200 61.000 50.400 56.300 1.700 0.700
B.A. 10.200 10.600 17.100 23.400 0.100 0.700
Post-grad 6.600 7.000 5.500 7.100 0.100 0.200
Mean  2.620 2.880 2.760 3.130 0.030 0.040
Coeff. of Variation 0.444 0.352 0.422 0.317 –0.012 –0.012
N 1,033 861 3,250 4,509
Notes: For comparability, samples are restricted to workers over age 25 working at least 20 hours per
week. Figures in top part of table are percentages. Means and c.v. calculated by taking ordinal codes as
numeric. All figures calculated using sample weights. 
Sources: Tabulations are made using data from the Survey of Working Conditions (1969), Quality of
Employment Survey (1977), and Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976, 1985).Trends in Job Skill Require m e n t s,Te c h n o l o g y, and Wage Inequality in the United States
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comparison of job skill trends prior to and during the period of greatest
inequality growth.
Table 2 gives a percentage breakdown of workers’ responses to the edu-
cation required question and annual change rates.14 For simplicity, fig-
ures for 1972 are not presented here (see Handel 2000b). The table tells
an interesting story. Fully one-quarter of respondents in 1969 re p o rt e d
that their jobs require eight years of education or less. The figure is over
one-third when those with jobs requiring grades 9–11 are added. These
numbers drop substantially by 1977, with almost all of the decline occur-
ring by 1972. Strangely, the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID)
figures for 1976 show a much greater concentration in the lowest educa-
tion required group than the Quality of Employment Survey (QES) for
1977, but the decline in the share reporting no need for any high school
falls by roughly the same amount. In fact, adding the first two rows of
the right panel of Table 2 shows that the eight-year QES series and the
nine-year PSID series show almost exactly the same trend rates in the
shift of jobs out of these two lowest skill categories, –1.9 and –1.5 per-
centage points per year respectively. For this reason the discussion con-
centrates on trend rates irrespective of level differences.
The share of middle-skill jobs, those requiring a high school degree or
some college, increases somewhat faster between 1969 and 1977 than
between 1976 and 1985. The share of high-skill jobs, those requiring a
college degree, rises more rapidly in the later period, though the differ-
ences are not dramatic. The growth of the share of jobs requiring a post-
graduate degree is roughly equal across the two series. In general, the
decline in very low-skill jobs, those requiring no high school education,
is more noticeable in both series than the growth in high-skill jobs.
To obtain a summary measure of the trends, the categorical education
re q u i red variable can be treated as numeric in order to calculate means
(Row 6) and a measure of the inequality of job skill re q u i rements, the
c o e fficient of variation (Row 7). Although the ordinal nature of the
m e a s u re argues for caution in interpreting means, the growth rates in
the mean are similar for the two series, 0.03 (1969 to 1977) and 0.04
(1976 to 1985), and are identical for the measure of inequality (coeff i-
cient of variation). Overall, then, there seems to be little diff e re n c ebetween the two series in the rate of growth in the level of form a l
education re q u i red by jobs or the rate of decline in the inequality of
educational re q u i re m e n t s .
Since the critical issue in the wage inequality debate is the extent to
which the skill re q u i rements of jobs and workers are mismatched, Table 3
gives the percentage of workers whose education is less than, equal to, or
g reater than the re q u i rements of their jobs and annual change rates. If the
g rowth of wage inequality is due to a skills mismatch, one might expect to
see some increase in the number of workers with less education than their
job re q u i res and corresponding decline in workers with more education
than their job re q u i res, reversing the growth of overeducated workers in
the 1970s when large numbers of college graduates entered the workforc e .
Table 3 shows that the number of undereducated workers grew by 2.4
percentage points from 1969 to 1972, fell by 1.2 percentage points from
1972 to 1977, and then grew by 2.3 percentage points from 1976 to
1985. The trend is in the direction predicted by the skills mismatch
hypothesis but neither the absolute change nor the annual change rate
suggests that the growth in undereducation from 1976 to 1985 was espe-
cially large. Indeed, the annual change rate was much higher between
1969 and 1972, when inequality was not growing.
The percentage of overeducated workers declined by 2.5 perc e n t a g e
points from 1969 to 1972, grew by 6.1 percentage points from 1972 to
1977, confirming the impression of a growth in overeducation during
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Table 3 Trends in the Percentage Under- and Overeducated, 1969–1985 
Percentage Annual Rate of Change  __________ ______________________
Year         Undereducated  Match  Overeducated     Undereducated  Match  Overeducated             N
1969 18.7 57.1 24.2 1,032
1972 21.1 57.3 21.7 0.80 0.07 –0.83 979
1977 19.8 52.5 27.8 –0.26 –0.96 1.22 857
1976 15.3 49.7 35.1 3,240
1985 17.6 53.5 28.9 0.26 0.42 –0.69 4,489
Note: Sample is all workers over age 25 working at least 20 hours per week. Undere d u c a t i o n
is defined as (own education–job educational re q u i rements) < 0 and overeducation is defined
as (own education–job educational re q u i rements) > 0.
S o u rc e : 1969: Survey of Working Conditions. 1972 and 1977: Quality of Employment
S u rveys. 1976 and 1985: Panel Survey of Income Dynamicsthis period, and then declined by 6.2 percentage points from 1976 to
1985. Again, the direction of the trend supports the skills mismatch
hypothesis, but the magnitude suggests more a return to the status quo
ante than a dramatic break with the past. The growth in undereducation
and decline in overeducation from 1976 to 1985 seem to be pretty much
part of the usual ebb and flow of these numbers.
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Table 4 Trends in Estimated Training Times in Months 
1976 1985
Training Times
Mean   20.0 20.0
(standard deviation) (25.5) (25.9)
Median 9.0 8.0
Coeff. of Variation 1.28 1.29
Percentage Breakdown
£ 1 month 23.1 22.5
> 1–3 months 13.3 12.3
> 3–6 months 12.2 14.2
> 6 months – 1 year 16.2 16.3
> 1–2 years 11.0 11.2
> 2 years 24.3 23.5
Medians
Education Required
Grades 0–8 2 2
Grades 9–11 1 1
High School 6 6
High School and Vocational Education — 12
Some College 12 12






Lower Blue-collar 2 2
Service 2 2
Note: Samples are household heads and spouses working at least 20 hours per week. The
figures change little when the PSID samples are expanded to include all workers regardless
of hours worked. Sample sizes are about 4,600 (3,600 for tabulations using occupation)
(Column 1) and about 5,480 (5,380 for tabulations using occupation) (Column 2).
Source: PSID76, PSID85.In short, though diff e rences in the data series suggest some caution in
splicing them together, there is little that suggests extraordinarily rapid
upgrading in job educational re q u i rements in the more recent period ,
during which inequality grew, compared to earlier periods, during which
inequality was relatively stable. Likewise, there is little evidence that the
nature of job–worker matches deteriorated notably during the period of
high inequality growth compared to earlier periods.
The second individual-level skill measure is training time or the time it
takes the average person to learn the re s p o n d e n t ’s job, which is only
available for the PSID series. The average training time is about 20
months and the median is about 8 to 9 months (Table 4). The raw
trends between 1976 and 1985 for mean and median are flat, and there is
also little change in the inequality of job training times (coefficient of
variation). A fuller percentage breakdown into diff e rent categories of
training time required does little to alter this picture. For example, about
a quarter of all jobs in both 1976 and 1985 could be learned in less than
a month. In most cases, jobs that re q u i re more formal education have
longer median training periods, but within educational levels there is lit-
tle change in job training time between 1976 and 1985, even for jobs
requiring a great deal of education. (The large change for postgraduates
reflects a clustering of cases around the median; the means show no
meaningful change.)
The situation is the same for trends in median training time within
broad occupational groups. The training times for the groups make intu-
itive sense; for example, lower blue-collar and service workers re q u i re
two months to learn their jobs and craft workers have a two-year appren-
ticeship. However, there is no difference of any kind over time.
If there is any series that would seem to confirm Spenner’s (1979) thesis
of little or no change in skill re q u i rements, it is this one. This is the
p e r i od during which upper and lower white-collar jobs experienced a
surge of computer use. However, there is no increase in training time for
these jobs even though few workers could have learned to use computers
in school this early in the diffusion process. If the appearance of comput-
ers in the workplace in large numbers dramatically increased job training
requirements, there is little evidence of it here.
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Most studies use direct measures of job skill re q u i rements drawn from the
D i c t i o n a ry of Occupational Ti t l e s (DOT) (1977), a government publication
with ratings of skill demands that has been used to produce ratings of job
complexity for narrowly-defined census occupations. Although the DOT
skill measures cannot capture all the variation of individual-level mea-
s u res, they can be combined with census data to generate a longer and
fuller time series than the individual-level measure s .
Six DOT skill measures are used here. The first, General Educational
Development (GED), is a six-point scale rating the formal educational
re q u i rements of an occupation. The second, Specific Vo c a t i o n a l
Preparation (SVP), is a nine-point scale rating the time required to learn
an occupation exclusive of schooling without specific vocational con-
tent. There are three six- to eight-point scales rating the level of
complexity at which the worker functions in relation to Data, People,
and Things. The sixth, Intelligence, is a measure of re q u i red worker
aptitude and uses a four-point scale indicating the percentile range of the
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Figure 8 Trends in Mean DOT Skill Measures (1960=100)
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N o t e : Declining scores for Things, People, Intelligence, and Data mean increasing skill.
S o u rc e : Decennial Census Microdata.
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D a t apopulation from which members of the occupation are drawn. Except for
GED and SVP, lower numbers indicate higher levels of skill.
Figure 8 shows trends in the six measures for 1960 to 1990 using census
data. GED and SVP slope upward, indicating increasing mean educa-
tional re q u i rements and training times. Data, People, and Intelligence
slope downward, also indicating increasing skill re q u i rements. By con-
trast, Things slopes upward, indicating an increasing prevalence of jobs
with lower manual skill requirements. However, Things is the only one
that suggests much acceleration in skill upgrading. In fact, all of the oth-
ers indicate that skill upgrading was marginally more rapid in the 1960s
than subsequently and least rapid in the 1980s. Similarly, when DOT
scores are combined with CPS data from 1968 to 1997 there is little evi-
dence that changes in occupational composition are leading to more
rapid upgrading of job skill requirements now than in previous decades
(see Handel 2000b).
Policy Imp l i c a t i o n s
The preceding findings cast strong doubt on claims that the growth of
wage inequality in the last twenty years is due to a skills short a g e ,
whether driven by an acceleration in the demand for skill arising from
the diffusion of advanced information technology or a deceleration in
the growth of the supply of skilled labor.
The heavy concentration of inequality growth in the recession years of
the early 1980s does not coincide with the slowdown in the growth of
workers’ educational attainment, which diverges most strongly from ear-
lier growth patterns in the late 1980s and 1990s. The flatness of both the
supply of educated workers and wage inequality in the 1990s casts fur-
ther doubt on the supply-side explanation.
Though the occupational composition shifted in favor of more skilled
workers during the period of inequality growth, this is true for previous
decades as well, when inequality did not grow dramatically, and there is
no evidence of any acceleration in the trend. Similarly, though dire c t
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DOT indicate a shift toward more skilled jobs, the trend is a steady, secu-
lar one, unlike the sharp growth of inequality in the early 1980s.
The evidence for a causal relationship between computer use and educa-
tional requirements is questionable and there are few examples of dispro-
p o rtionate growth or decline in occupations likely to be sensitive to
technological change. In short, it is hard to find evidence that informa-
tion technology has done much to alter either the skill content of work
within occupations or the occupational composition of the workforc e ,
leaving the demand-side explanation with little support.
The most powerful factors affecting wages would seem to be the reces-
sion and trade deficits of the early 1980s, which coincided with the most
dramatic growth in wage inequality and the most noticeable change in
occupational composition: the sharp decline in blue-collar manufactur-
ing workers in the early 1980s. The modest decline in inequality during
the expansion of the 1990s also suggests the importance of macro e c o-
nomic forces. It appears that the skill re q u i rements of postindustrial
technology have had far less influence on wages than the state of the
overall economy.
The clearest policy implication of this re s e a rch is the need to maintain
g rowth and low unemployment. The least affluent workers bear most of
the burdens of recession, and severe shocks, such as the deep re c e s s i o n
of the early 1980s, have the power to reshape the wage stru c t u re. When
the stru c t u re is changed, relative wage losses for those in the lower part
of the distribution are not reversed when the business cycle turn s
u p w a rd; they persist for decades. Government can perf o rm its gre a t e s t
s e rvice to workers by maintaining tight labor markets and avoiding
policies that are sharply re c e s s i o n a ry. In addition, government can sup-
p o rt wages at the lower end of the distribution with policies to re v e r s e
the decline of institutional protections that has continued since the
economic crisis of the early 1980s. Such policies include maintaining
the real value of the minimum wage and supporting protections for
unions that pre s e rve some balance between the bargaining power of
workers and management.
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None of the preceding should be taken to imply that policy should
ignore the education and training of workers. Workforce development is
critical for improving productivity and product quality. Apprenticeships,
school-to-work programs, and tuition assistance deserve active support.
Subsidies for brief computer and other general technical training are
likely to have positive returns. The provision of such training to disad-
vantaged and displaced workers can help overcome market imperf e c-
tions. The point is not that education and training are unimport a n t ;
they have always been good ideas. However, they are not enough. The
recent growth in inequality does not have its origins in the growth of a
gap between worker skills and job skill re q u i rements and inequality is
unlikely to be reduced by skill development initiatives alone. A decline
in inequality re q u i res macro policies to maintain growth and full
employment and minimum wage and labor policies that directly support
wages in the lower part of the wage distribution.N ote s
1 . For instance, about 78 percent of household heads and spouses employed in
1985 re p o rted at least nine years’ actual work experience in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (author’s tabulations). Although this figure does not
include young adults in the labor force who still lived with their parents, it
gives a general sense of the overlap between the workforces in the mid 1980s
and the mid 1970s.
2. The material in this policy brief is drawn from two working papers, where
m o re detailed description of data, methods, and results may be found (see
Handel 2000a, 2000b).
3. The differential is roughly one year when controlling for age, female, black,
part-time status, marital status and its interaction with female, region, and
three-digit industry. When controls for one-digit occupation are added, the
estimated differential is cut roughly in half. The models are estimated sepa-
rately using cross-sectional data from the October CPS supplements for
1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997. For details see Handel (2000a).
4. More formally, this model can be written as
DEdi = a + b*DCi + ei
where
DEdi = average annual change in mean years of education within occu-
pation i or annual change in percentage share of an education group
(e.g. high school graduates) within occupation i
DCi = average annual change in the percentage of computer users
within occupation i
ei = error term
See Handel (2000a) for further details.
5. Although the computer equipment industry employs workers of all skill lev-
els, it is worthwhile to note that this industry never accounted for as much
as 1 percent of total employment. Between 1971–1985, the computer hard-
ware industry share of employment rose from 0.27 percent to 0.85 percent,
before falling to 0.57 percent in 1997. 
6. Average sample size for grocery stores is 1,460. Census figures for 1980 and
1990 do suggest a decline in the share of cashiers within grocery stores, from
about 30 percent to about 26 percent, though this is still well above the level
in 1970 (20 percent).
7. Average sample size for wholesale and retail industries in the March CPS is
12,302.
8. Average sample size for banking and insurance in the March CPS is 2,787.
9. Average sample size for banking in the March CPS is 1,075.
10. Average sample size for the postal industry in the March CPS is 489.
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12. Average sample size for the auto industry in the March CPS is 650.
13. The data are from the Survey of Working Conditions (SWC) (1969),
Quality of Employment Surveys (QES) (1972, 1977), and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) (1976, 1985). Despite the difference in name, the
SWC is part of the same data series as the two QES surveys.
The exact items for the SWC/QES are “What level of formal education do
you feel is needed by a person in your job?” (education re q u i red). For the
PSID the items are “How much formal education is required [these days—
1985] to get a job like yours?” (education required) and “On a job like yours,
how long would it take the average new person to become fully trained and
qualified?” (months) (training time).
In addition, household heads in the PSID were re-asked the skill questions
in 1978. This information was used to estimate individual-level reliabilities
in a separate validation exercise in Handel (2000b). For more details on the
sample and analyses that follow see Handel (2000b).
14. There is a significant noncomparability issue for this item in both data series.
The SWC (1969) and the PSID85 allowed respondents to say that their jobs
re q u i red high school plus vocational education, but none of the other surv e y s
included this option. Since it is unclear how many of these respondents would
have replied either “high school” or “some college” had this option not existed,
all comparisons aggregate figures for those choosing any of the three options.
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